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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
with the term "employee," the courts and the NLRB have excluded
those supervisory personnel whose functions identified them closely
with management. It is submitted that section 8(b) (4) (i) was
designed primarily to bring those "employees," excluded under the
old section, within the ambit of the secondary boycott provisions.
However, nowhere does it appear that Congress intended to abolish
the distinction between "supervisors" and "employees." Hence,
section 8(b) (4) (i) has properly been interpreted as excluding per-
sons with management-like authority, since such authority justifies
their treatment as "agents" of the neutral employer, rather than as
employees.
X
SALES-BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY-PRIVITY UNNECES-
SARY FOR RECOVERY.-Plaintiff husband bought an automobile from
defendant dealer which had been manufactured by defendant Chrysler
Corporation. The dealer-manufacturer warranty disclaimed all war-
ranties except the replacement of parts.' Ten days after purchase,
plaintiff wife received injuries in an automobile accident when the
car went out of control due to a defective steering mechanism.2
Plaintiff wife and plaintiff husband brought a breach of warranty ac-
tion against both dealer and manufacturer. The Supreme Court of
New Jersey held that the wife could recover for personal injuries,
and the husband, for loss of services, against both dealer and manu-
facturer regardless of privity. The Court further stated that the
dealer-manufacturer warranty disclaimer was invalid as a matter of
public policy. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358,
161 A.2d 69 (1960).
In 1890 the New York Court of Appeals emphasized that "a
sound public policy . .. demands that the doctrine of caveat emptor
shall be still further encroached upon, rather than that the public
health shall be endangered." 3 Some years later, when an eminent
' The warranty expressly guaranteed the replacement of parts for 90 days
or 4,000 miles, whichever occurred first. It expressly disclaimed all other
warranties.
2 The car was demolished in the accident, making it impossible to dis-
cover where the defect had occurred. The only substantial evidence of a
defect, aside from the wife's testimony that the car went completely out of
control, was an opinion by the insurance inspector that there must have been
some mechanical defect to cause the car to react the way it did. Henningsen
v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, -, 161 A.2d 69, 75 (1960).
3 Fairbank Canning Co. v. Metzger, 118 N.Y. 260, 267, 23 N.E. 372, 374
(1890).
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jurist 4 wrote the celebrated opinion in MacPherson v. Buick Motor
Co.,5 a most decisive blow was struck in the name of public policy
and the manufacturer's shield of privity was pierced with a broad
exception. The right to bring a personal injury action against a
manufacturer for negligence was granted to the ultimate buyer despite
a lack of any contractual relationship, provided the defective product
was likely to cause injury. With the passage of more than forty
years this right has apparently been extended "to anyone who may
reasonably be expected to be in the vicinity of the chattel's probable
use and to be endangered if it is defective." 6 Thus today, almost
the entire public is guaranteed the right of indemnification for per-
sonal injuries where a manufacturer is shown to be at fault.7
Recognizing, however, the difficulty of proof in negligence ac-
tions,8 the buyer has ofttimes elected to proceed against his immediate
vendor (the retailer) in an action for breach of implied warranty of
merchantability.9 This enables him to establish a cause of action
without any evidence of negligence. The retailer is held strictly liable
upon a mere showing that the product was defective when sold to
the plaintiff, and that the defect resulted in the plaintiff's injury.10
In recent years there has been a considerable effort by a num-
ber of courts and legal writers to make the manufacturer a guarantor
4 Judge Cardozo, fifteen years after the MacPherson decision, commented
with approval: "The assault upon the citadel of privity is proceeding in
these days apace." Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co., 255 N.Y. 170,
180, 174 N.E. 441, 445 (1931).
5217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).6 Hinton v. Republic Aviation Corp., 180 F. Supp. 31, 34 (S.D.N.Y. 1959);
cf. Kalinowski v. Truck Equipment Co., 237 App. Div. 472, 261 N.Y. Supp.
657 (4th Dep't 1933) (injured pedestrian's complaint for negligent repair of
truck sustained as against repair company); Odom v. Ford Motor Co., 230
S.C. 320, -, 95 S.E.2d 601, 604 (1956).
7An injured plaintiff may also bring suit against the middleman who con-
tributed to the finished product and whose failure to discover an existing
defect might well constitute negligence. Mueller v. Teichner, 6 N.Y.2d 903,
190 N.Y.S.2d 709 (1959) (memorandum decision); Smith v. Peerless Glass
Co., 259 N.Y. 292, 181 N.E. 576 (1932).
8 See PROSSER, TORTS 505 (2d ed. 1955), wherein the author points out
the evidentiary problems which face the plaintiff.
9N.Y. PEas. PROP. LAW § 96(2); Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores,
255 N.Y. 388, 175 N.E. 105 (1931). The Ryan case held the retailer liable
to his immediate vendee where the vendee acted through an agent. The case
is miscited in the present decision for the proposition that recovery may be
had regardless of privity. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J.
358, -, 161 A.2d 69, 83 (1960).
10 PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 8, at 494; Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
Inc., supra note 9, at -, 161 A.2d at 77.
The defect must be the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. See
Epstein v. John Mullens & Sons, 266 App. Div. 665, 40 N.Y.S.2d 212 (2d
Dep't 1943) (memorandum decision), aff'd mnm., 292 N.Y. 535, 54 N.E.2d
381 (1944) (recovery denied where splinter resulting from dusting a bed was
held not incidental to the proper use of the bed).
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of his products.11 This has been motivated primarily by "an in-
creased feeling that social policy demands that the burden of acci-
dental injuries caused by defective chattels be placed upon the pro-
ducer, since he is best able to distribute the risk to the general public
by means of prices and insurance." 12 The result has been an exten-
sion of the manufacturer's warranty to the ultimate buyer.' 3  There
appears to be little contest 14 over the virtues of such an extension. 15
The amount of damages for personal injuries is governed by foresee-
ability. Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, supra note 9 (injuries caused
by a pin in a loaf of bread held compensable).
n1 PRossER, op. cit. supra note 8, at 506.
12 Ibid. Dean Prosser continues: "Added to this is the difficulty of
proving negligence in many cases where it exists, even with the aid of res ipsa
loquitur, together with the wastefulness and uncertainty of a series of war-
ranty actions carrying liability back through retailer, jobber and wholesaler to
the original maker, the practice of reputable manufacturers to stand behind
their goods as sound business policy, and a recognition that the intermediate
dealer is usually a mere conduit to market the product." Id. at 56-0 (foot-
notes omitted)."
13 PROSSEa, op. cit. supra note 8, at 506-07. Most of the cases have adopted
some theory of warranty in order to hold the manufacturer strictly liable to
the buyer. The extension has been made primarily in the area of food cases.
Sixteen jurisdictions have previously made the extension by judicial decision
(Arizona, California, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan,
Mississippi, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, Texas, Virginia and
Washington). Thirteen jurisdictions still refused to make the extension
(Alabama, Arkansas, District of Columbia, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, South Dakota,
Tennessee and Wisconsin). North Carolina and West Virginia probably still
reject strict liability although their position is doubtful. Five states have
strict liability under statute (Connecticut, Georgia, Minnesota, Montana and
South Carolina). Thirteen states appear to have no definite law (Alaska,
Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota,
Oregon, Utah, Vermont and Wyoming). Prosser, The Assault Upm; the
Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1106-10 (1960). The present case apparently places
New Jersey among those states applying strict liability. It is also notable that
strict liability may be achieved in food cases in New York under the Agricul-
ture and Markets Law. See note 25 infra.
In the area of products other than food most courts refuse to apply strict
liability. However, a few recent decisions have continued the attack on privity
and have held the manufacturer liable to the buyer for defects in such things
as hair dye, soap, a permanent wave set, a cigarette, a grinding wheel, an
electric cable, and an automobile tire. Prosser, supra at 1110-13. The present
case appears to be the most sweeping extension yet, since recovery was per-
mitted though privity had been twice removed (the buyer's wife recovering
against the manufacturer of the automobile). How far this extension may go
the Court refused to say, but there was no disapproval expressed over an
extension to any member of the public whose injury might be reasonably
foreseen. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69,
100-01 (1960).
14 PRossaR, TORTS 506 (2d ed. 1955).
15 Prosser, supra note 13, at 1114-24. The noted author presents an excel-
lent discussion of the pros and cons of strict manufacturer liability, favoring
the latter.
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There is, however, some question as to how this extension should
be accomplished.16
In the present case, the Supreme Court of New Jersey, under
the banner of public policy, has established manufacturer warranty
liability in defiance of both lack of privity 17 and disclaimer.' 8
Whether the New York Court of Appeals will follow this example
may be answered in the near future.' 9
Under the New York Constitution's separation of powers, it has
long been recognized that judicial bodies were created to apply laws, 20
not to make them.21 "When the judicial function impinges upon the
legislative, no matter how salutary or noble the motives, it subverts
the constitutional structure of our state government." 22
"I As already indicated, the majority of jurisdictions have achieved this
extension by judicial decision. See note 13 supra. There is, however, an
opposing view which emphasizes that such change should be brought about
only by legislation. See Torpey v. Red Owl Stores, 129 F. Supp. 404, 410
(D. Minn. 1955), aff'd, 228 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1955); Chanin v. Chevrolet
Motor Co., 15 F. Supp. 57, 58-59 (N.D. Ill. 1935).
17 Some automobile cases concerning denials of recovery for implied war-
ranty on the grounds of lack of privity alone are: Dennis v. Willys-Overland
Motors, Inc., 111 F. Supp. 875 (W.D. Mo. 1953); MacDonald v. Packard
Rochester, Inc., 206 Misc. 16, 132 N.Y.S.2d 322 (Sup. Ct. 1954); Smith v.
Ford Motor Co., 327 S.W. 2d 535 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959). See also Shoopak
v. U.S. Rubber Co., 17 Misc.2d 201, 183 N.Y.S.2d 112 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
's Similar cases which have denied recovery on the grounds of a disclaimer
in the automobile warranty are: Still v. Rabin, 83 N.Y.S.2d 137 (App. T. 1948)
(per curiam) ; Sonnenberg v. Nolan Motors, Inc., 2 Misc.2d 185, 36 N.Y.S.2d
549 (App. T. 1942) (per curiam); Hall v. Everett Motors, Inc., - Mass.2d
-, 165 N.E.2d 107 (1960); Getzoff v. Von Lengerke Buick Co., 14 N.J.
Misc. 750, 187 AtI. 539 (Sup. Ct. 1936) (per curiamy; Norton Buick Co. v.
E. W. Tune Co., - Okla. -, 351 P.2d 731 (1960). The disclaimers which
were sustained in the Hall and Nortoit Buick Co. cases were in effect iden-
tical to the disclaimer held invalid in the present case.
19Two recent warranty cases are pending on appeal to the Court of
Appeals. Greenberg v. Lorenz, 12 Misc.2d 883, 178 N.Y.S.2d 407 (App. T.),
modified, 7 App. Div.2d 968, 183 N.Y.S.2d 46 (1st Dep't), leave to appeal
granted, 8 App. Div.2d 609, 185 N.Y.S.2d 740 (1st Dep't 1959); Papp v.
Jackson Mfg. Co., 8 App. Div.2d 637, 185 N.Y.S.2d 872 (2d Dep't), leave to
appeal granted, 6 N.Y.2d 845, 160 N.E.2d 86, 188 N.Y.S.2d 551 (1959). In
both cases the Appellate Division found no warranty liability where there
was a lack of privity. The Greenberg lower court opinion, which has in effect
been overruled, was cited as authority in the present case. Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, -, 161 A.2d 69, 83 (1960).
20 "That which distinguishes a judicial from a legislative act is, that the
one is the determination of what the existing law is in relation to some existing
thing already done or happened, while the other is a predetermination of what
the lava shall be for the regulation of all future cases falling under its pro-
visions." Nash v. Brooks, 251 App. Div. 616, 618, 297 N.Y.Supp. 853, 855-56
(3d Dep't 1937), aff'd, 276 N.Y. 75, 11 N.E.2d 545 (1938) (emphasis added),
quoting 1 COOLEY, COUSTIrtrrIONAL LimTATIoNs 183 (8th ed. 1927).
21 Cort v. Smith, 249 App. Div. 1, 291 N.Y. Supp. 54 (4th Dep't), aff'd
men., 273 N.Y. 481, 6 N.E.2d 414 (1936). See also Bareham v. Board of
Supervisors, 247 App. Div. 534, 288 N.Y. Supp. 185 (4th Dep't 1936).
22 People v. Johnson, 13 Misc.2d 376, 380, 169 N.Y.S.2d 217, 221 (West-
chester County Ct. 1957).
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By statute 23 as well as decision 24 the law of New York appears
quite clear that actions for breach of implied warranty are limited
to the immediate parties of the sale, namely, the buyer and seller.
Where public policy has demanded change the legislature has not re-
mained silent. In 1939 the Agriculture and Markets Law 25 imposed
23 Section 96 of the Personal Property Law sets forth the exclusive condi-
tions under which an implied warranty may arise, and speaks only in terms
of "buyer" and "seller." The terms "buyer" and "seller" were incorporated
into the law with the immediate parties to the sale in mind, and at a time
when there was no such thing as a warranty to any third person. Prosser,
The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1128-29 (1960). The statute
became law even before the MacPherson. case.
24 Campo v. Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950); Bourcheix v.
Willow Brook Dairy, Inc., 268 N.Y. 1, 196 N.E. 617 (1935); Turner v.
Edison Storage Battery Co., 248 N.Y. 73, 161 N.E. 423 (1928); Chysky v.
Drake Bros. Co., 235 N.Y. 468, 472, 139 N.E. 576, 577-78 (1923).
There have been a number of lower court food cases which have attacked
the privity requirement in allowing recovery. Parish v. Great Atlantic and
Pacific Tea Co., 13 Misc.2d 33, 177 N.Y.S.2d 7 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1958);
Welch v. Schiebelhuth, 11 Misc.2d 312, 169 N.Y.S.2d 309 (Sup. Ct. 1957);
see Walker v. Hot Shoppes, Inc., 21 Misc.2d 103, - N.Y.S.2d - (Albany
County Ct. 1960); Singer v. Zabelin, 24 N.Y.S.2d 962 (N.Y. City Ct. 1941).
But in 1959, three departments of the New York Appellate Division directly
held that privity was required for recovery. Greenberg v. Lorenz, 7 App.
Div.2d 968, 183 N.Y.S.2d 46 (1st Dep't 1959); Papp v. Jackson Mfg. Co.,
8 App. Div.2d 637, 185 N.Y.S.2d 872 (2d Dep't 1959) (memorandum de-
cision); Burke v. Associated Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, Inc., 7 -App. Div.2d
942, 181 N.Y.S.2d 800 (3d Dep't 1959) (memorandum decision).
A strict application of the privity requirement can result in extremely
harsh decisions. See Vaccaro v. Prudential Condensed Milk Co., 133 Misc.
556, 232 N.Y. Supp. 299 (N.Y. City Ct. 1927). However, the Court of
Appeals, in an attempt to insure just results, has applied the agency theory
in favor of the injured plaintiff in most cases. Note, 44 CORNELL L.Q. 608,
611 (1959), wherein the author cites the important Court of Appeals deci-
sions in this area.
The present case cites Blessington v. McCrory Stores Corp., 305 N.Y.
140, 111 N.E.2d 421 (1953), as holding "by clear implication" that New York
has abolished the privity rule. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32
N.J. 358, -, 161 A.2d 69, 83 (1960). The Blessinqton case held that the six
year contract period of limitations applied to breach of warranty actions. In
so holding, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division which had
stated, "the action for breach of warranty, even though it rests on a tortious
or wrongful act committed by the defendant is independent of an action for
negligence. The wrongful act is not neglect, and privity is an essential to
recovery." Blessington v. McCrory Stores Corp., 279 App. Div. 806, 109
N.Y.S.2d 719 (2d Dep't 1952) (memorandum decision) (emphasis added).
A recent federal case applying New York law disallowed recovery where
no privity existed. McDonald v. Blue Jeans Corp., 183 F. Supp. 149 (S.D.
N.Y. 1960) (action against manufacturer of a cowboy suit which had caught
fire and burned infant for whom the suit was purchased-facts identical with
the Blessington case).
25 N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW §§ 199, 199-a, 200. Section 199-a provides:
"No person or persons, firm, association or corporation shall within this state
manufacture, compound, brew, distill, produce, process, pack, transport, possess,
sell, offer or expose for sale, or serve in any hotel, restaurant, eating house
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a statutory standard of care on the manufacturer of food products,
the violation of which is negligence per se.26  A liberal application
of the statute would permit recovery by anyone injured eating de-
fective food, regardless of privity.
27
In 1959, an even further extension of liability was considered
by the legislature in the form of a bill which would permit implied
warranty actions against any seller by employees, members of the
household, or guests of the buyer who had been injured due to a
defective product.28 Whether this bill or a bill holding all manu-
facturers strictly liable 29 for their products will ever become law in
or other place of public entertainment any article of food which is
adulterated. .. ."
26Alphin v. La Salle Diners, Inc., 197 Misc. 415, 98 N.Y.S.2d 511 (N.Y.
City Ct 1950); see Catalanello v. Cudahy Packing Co., 264 App. Div. 723,
34 N.Y.S.2d 37 (2d Dep't 1942) (memorandum decision).
27 See Note, 44 CORNELL L.Q. 608, 615 (1959), wherein the author suggests
that the reason the statute is not used more often is due to its obscurity in a
"maze of the New York statutes." It seems more likely, however, that the
reluctance of plaintiffs to make use of the statute is the result of its strict
application. It has been held not to apply to broken glass in a bottle of milk
and a screw in a slice of rye bread, both of which are apparently covered by
implied warranty if privity can be shown. See Ryan v. Progressive Grocery
Stores, 255 N.Y. 388, 175 N.E.2d 105 (1931) (holding implied warranty ap-
plicable to loaf of bread with a pin in it) ; Courter v. Dilbert Bros., 19 Misc.2d
935, 945, 186 N.Y.S.2d 334, 344 (Sup. Ct. 1959) (discussing the Agriculture
and Markets Law).
28 See 1959 Leg. Doc. No. 65(B), N.Y. LAw REVISION COMMISSION
REp. 58 (1959); Note, 44 CoRNEL. L.Q. 608 (1959). The bill provides:
"A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person
who is an employee, member of the household or guest of the buyers, if it
is reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or be affected by
the goods." Id. at 613. The bill apparently applies to the manufacturer only
if he sells directly to the buyer.
The Uniform Commercial Code has an identical section which further
adds: "A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this section."
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-318 (1959).
The comment of the Commissioners adds: "Beyond this, the section is
neutral and is not intended to enlarge or restrict the developing case law on
whether the seller's warranties, given to his buyer who resells, extend to
other persons in the distributive chain." Ibid.
29 Thus far the only New York case permitting the ultimate consumer to
sue the manufacturer for breach of warranty is Lardaro v. MBS Cigar Corp.,
10 Misc.2d 873, 177 N.Y.S.2d 6 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1957) (defective candy
bar). See Note, supra note 28, at 614.
There is, of course, a vital distinction between manufactured goods in a
sealed container as in the Lardaro case, and manufactured goods which are
fully exposed as the automobile in the present case. In the latter instance
there was a great opportunity for the defect in the car to have occurred in
shipment from manufacturer to dealer or even during the period when the
dealer was servicing the car. If the automobile in the present case had become
defective after leaving the manufacturer, the plaintiff should not have recovered
from him in warranty. Tiffin v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 18 Ill.2d
48, 162 N.E.2d 406 (1959); Cudahy Packing Co. v. Baskin, 170 Miss. 834,
155 So. 217 (1934) ; PROSSER, TORTS 509 (2d ed. 1955). The exact time when
the defect occurred, however, was not discussed in the present decision.
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New York is a matter to be ultimately decided by the public's elected
representatives, and the courts have no power to accelerate, or rather
pre-empt, the legislative process by envisioning the public's demands. 30
As the Court of Appeals itself has stated, "to impose upon a manu-
facturer the duty of producing an accident-proof product may be a
desirable aim, but no such obligation has been--or, in our view, may
be-imposed by judicial decision." 31
Section 152 of the Personal Property Law, a vital section in the
warranty area, provides: "Where any right, duty or liability would
arise under a contract to sell or a sale by implication of law, it may
be negatived, or varied by express agreement . ." 32 This section
has been construed to allow a seller to expressly negate implied
warranties, 33 and even upon the sale of an automobile such a dis-
claimer has been held valid. 34  The creation of an exception to such
a statute, as was in effect done by the present decision,3 ' is again
properly within the province of the legislature rather than the courts.36
30 Strict liability is still the exception in this country. See Petition of
Oskar Tiedemann & Co., 179 F. Supp. 227, 238 (D. Del. 1959). The United
States Supreme Court has stated the law as follows: "It is a general prin-
ciple of our law that there is no individual liability for an act which ordinary
human care and foresight could not guard against. It is also a general prin-
ciple of the same law that a loss from any cause purely accidental must rest
where it chances to fall. But behind and above these general principles which
the law recognizes as ordinarily prevailing, there lies the legislative power,
which, in the absence of organic restraint, may, for the general welfare of
society, impose obligations and responsibilities otherwise n6n-existent." City
of Chicago v. Sturges, 222 U.S. 313, 322 (1911) (emphasis added).
31 Campo v. Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 472, 95 N.E.2d 802, 804 (1950). The
Campo case was cited with approval in Inman v. Binghamton Housing
Authority, 3 N.Y.2d 137, 145, 143 N.E.2d 895, 899, 164 N.Y.S.2d 699, 704
(1957). Both of the decisions were made by a unanimous Court of Appeals.
Six of the judges in the Ininan case and four in the Campo case are still on
the Court of Appeals. Thus, unless these judges have changed their posi-
tions, it seems very unlikely that strict liability will be imposed on a manu-
facturer in New York by judicial decision, as was done in the present case.3 2 N.Y. PES. PROP. LAW § 152 (emphasis added). New Jersey has an
identical statute. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:30-3 (1940).
33 Lumbrazo v. Woodruff, 256 N.Y. 92, 175 N.E. 525 (1931).
34 See note 18 supra.
35 Whether a disclaimer upon the sale of automobiles is against public
policy, as was held in the present case, is highly questionable in New York.
In Broderick Haulage v. Mack-International Motor Truck Corp., 1 App. Div.2d
649, 153 N.Y.S.2d 127 (1st Dep't 1956) (per curiam), the court stated that
a "disclaimer of warranty provision (in a contract for the sale of trucks)
does not offend public policy. Such provisions are permitted by statute,
Personal Property Law, § 152, and have been recognized as valid and binding
provisions of sales contracts." Id. at 650, 153 N.Y.S.2d at 128. Compare
Linn v. Radio Center Delicatessen, Inc., 169 Misc. 879, 9 N.Y.S.2d 110 (N.Y.
Munic. Ct. 1939), wherein plaintiff recovered in warranty for injury caused
by a tack in pastry regardless of bakery's disclaimer which was held to be
against natural justice and good morals.
36 See Martin v. School Bd., 301 N.Y. 233, 239, 93 N.E.2d 655, 658 (1950);
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The rule of construction of legislative enactment is that a statute be read
and given effect as it is written by the Legislature. The Court may not in
the face of clear language, substitute its concept of what should or would
have been written if all the problems and complications had been foreseen in
the course of the application of the statute37
The fact that there has not as yet been a legislative change in
the law of warranty in New York compelling the manufacturer to
place an absolute guarantee on his products as may be some indica-
tion that public opinion has failed to rally behind this "attack on the
citadel of privity." 39 Two recent New York negligence cases may
explain this passivity.
In Mueller v. Teichner 40 the defendant middleman contributed
to the completion of bottles of soda water by placing siphons in the
bottles. The defendant then sold the bottles to another party who
filled them with soda water, and the finished product was ultimately
distributed to the public. A defective bottle exploded, causing the
plaintiff injury. The Court of Appeals held that the defendant mid-
dleman's failure to inspect the bottles properly prior to inserting the
siphons constituted negligence even though he did not cause the
defect.
The case of Markel v. Spencer 41 was very similar to the present
case. Defendant Ford Motor Co. had manufactured a car which was
ultimately bought by defendant Spencer. Spencer's car collided with
plaintiffs' car causing them injury. Spencer testified that his car
failed to stop upon a proper application of the brakes, due to a de-
Kane v. Walsh, 295 N.Y. 198, 207, 66 N.E.2d 53, 56-57 (1946); Kiriloff v.
A.G.W. Wet Wash Laundry, 293 N.Y. 222, 227, 56 N.E.2d 559, 561 (1944).
37 Bryant Park Bldg., Inc. v. Frutkin, 10 Misc.2d 198, 202, 167 N.Y.S.2d
184, 189 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1957). "'It is the province of the statesman ...
and the Legislature to determine what is best for the public good and to
provide for it by proper enactments. It is the province of the judge to ex-
pound the law only . . . not to speculate upon what is best in his opinion,
for the advantage of the community." WHITNEY, CONTRACrS 189 (5th ed.
1953), quoting Baron Parke.38 An extension of the manufacturer's warranty as in the present case
would grant the dealer only a hope of not being joined in the suit by the
plaintiff. Even if the plaintiff brings suit against the manufacturer alone
there is the possibility that the dealer would be impleaded by the manufac-
turer on the grounds that his negligence caused the defect in the product.
See Derby Junior Coat & Suit Co. v. Wollman Mills, Inc., 207 Misc. 330,
137 N.Y.S.2d 703 (Sup. Ct. 1955); cf. Eisenbach v. Gimbel Bros., 291 N.Y.
474, 24 N.E.2d 131 (1939). Thus it appears that the only real benefit of an
extension of warranty is to the buyer.
39 See note 4 supra. There is, of course, the possibility that there is a lack
of public interest in the area of warranty, for the simple reason that very
few people encounter injuries which would bring an action in warranty into
play.
40 6 N.Y.2d 903, 161 N.E.2d 14, 190 N.Y.S.2d 709 (1959) (memorandum
decision).
415 App. Div. 2d 400, 171 N.Y.S.2d 770 (4th Dep't 1958).
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fective bolt in the mechanism. No other evidence was adduced to
establish the fact of a defective bolt. In holding Ford liable, the
Appellate Division stated that the jury could reasonably infer that
the car was defective when it left the manufacturer and that such
defect was due to the manufacturer's negligence. The case was af-
firmed by the Court of Appeals. 42
Had the present case arisen in New York, the Mueller and
Markel decisions might very well have permitted recovery in neg-
ligence 43 against both dealer 44 and manufacturer. 45 Indeed, in view
of such decisions, both dealer and manufacturer would do their utmost
to settle the case before trial.46 Such a result, of course, would em-
phasize that what remains of the manufacturer's shield of privity has
already been effectively circumvented in New York by liberal appli-
cation of the MacPherson doctrine.
42 Markel v. Spencer, 5 N.Y.2d 958, 157 N.E.2d 713, 184 N.Y.S.2d 835
(1959) (memorandum decision); accord, Guagliardo v. Ford Motor Co., 7 App.
Div.2d 472, 184 N.Y.S.2d 1012 (4th Dep't 1959); see Alexander v. Nash-
Kelvinator Corp., 261 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1958).
Another case where negligence appears to have been liberally inferred is
Alexander v. Torridaire Co., 265 N.Y. 616, 193 N.E. 412 (1934).
43 The manufacturer-dealer warranty did not disclaim negligence.
44 The jury under the Mueller decision could find that the dealer's failure
to discover the defect in servicing the car indicated a failure to exercise rea-
sonable care, thus constituting negligence.
45 The Markel decision would apparently prevent a directed verdict against
the plaintiff in the present case. A jury verdict in favor of a defendant
manufacturer on the issue of negligence is virtually unknown. Prosser,
The Assault Upon. the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1114-15 (1960). The plain-
tiff's prime concern comes on appeal, but in view of the Markel case, such
concern may be greatly dispelled.46 A very small number of personal injury and wrongful death actions go
to trial. See Gair v. Peck, 6 N.Y.2d 97, 102, 160 N.E.2d 43, 45-46, 188
N.Y.S.2d 491, 494 (1959).
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